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Confession in Law & Literature
Peter Brooks*
Mea culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a plea that
cannot be exacted from free men by human authority.
Abe Fortas
I have only one thing to fear in this enterprise; that isn't to say
too much or to say untruths; it's rather not to say everything,
and to silence truths.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau2
* Tripp Professor of Humanities, Yale University. For helpful advice and comment on this
essay, my thanks to several friends and colleagues who read and criticized earlier drafts: Akhil
Amar, Owen Fiss, Juliet Mitchell, Louis Michael Seidman, Robert Weisberg, and Paul Gewirtz.
Co-teaching a course on "Narrative in Law and Literature" with Paul Gewirtz has proved an
incomparable learning experience.
This essay was first given as a talk in the symposium, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, at
the Yale Law School, February 10-11, 1995. It will also appear, in slightly different form, in
LAW'S STORIES (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.), which will be available from the Yale
University Press in the Spring of 1996.
1. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, in 25 THE JOURNAL
91, 98 (Cleveland Bar Association, 1954), cited in LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 431 (1986).
2. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, CONFESSIONS, AUTRES TEXTES AUTOBIOGRAPHIQUES 175
(Bernard Gagnebin & Marcel Raymond eds., Gallimard: Biblioth~que de la Pl6iade. 1962).
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I want to talk about a certain kind of narrative that has long held
a particularly problematic status in the law. As a kind of prologue to
my remarks, let me mention the record of a criminal case that I
stumbled upon in the Yale Law Library. It is from 1819 in Manches-
ter, Vermont, where the disappearance of the cantankerous Russell
Colvin led to an accusation that his feuding neighbors, Stephen and
Jesse Boom, had murdered him-to which, after their conviction, they
eventually confessed, only to have it discovered that Colvin wasn't
even dead, but merely gone to live in Schenectady, New York. The
subtitle of a narrative of the events gives the essential information:
"A Full and Veracious Account of the Amazing Events in Vermont:
How Stephen and Jesse Boom, two Brothers, were Accused,
Arrested, Indicted, Tried, Convicted and Sentenced to Die by
Hanging for the Wilful Murder of Russell Colvin of Manchester,
Having confessed the Crime; how, while the Condemned Men
Languished in Prison, it was Proved that Colvin had not been
Murdered, but was Alive and in Good Health and how He Returned
to Manchester and Saved the Unfortunate Doomed Men from a
Terrible Fate."3
The confession narrative is a particularly dramatic instance of a
story that needs to be told, but needs to be told voluntarily, in the
correct context, according to the rules. I want to ask why it is that
confession-specifically the context in which confession is acceptable,
certifiably voluntary, and thus admissible in evidence-has posed such
a problem to the law. I also want to consider whether the long
tradition of literary confession may offer any illumination. The
encounter between legal and literary discourses on the nature and
contexts of the confessional act may help us understand why it has
proved so difficult to offer a convincing analysis of the protections
accorded self-incrimination.
In Miranda v. Arizona,4 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
issued its most far-reaching and controversial ruling on the place and
use of confessions in the criminal law. The Court established rules for
determining what might be considered a "true confession"-rules that
immediately entered the popular consciousness as the "Miranda
warnings," familiar from arrests in almost any TV cop show: You
Translations from Rousseau are my own.
3. These essentials of the narrative are presented on the title page of the most recent
recounting of the case: JOHN SPARGO, THE RETURN OF RUSSELL COLVIN (1945). See also
LEONARD SARGENT, THE TRIAL, CONFESSIONS AND CONVICTION OF JESSE AND STEPHEN
BOORN, FOR THE MURDER OF RUSSELL COLVIN, AND THE RETURN OF THE MAN SUPPOSED
TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED (Manchester, VT, Journal Book and Job Office, 1873). Sargent,
later Lieutenant Governor of Vermont, was one of the lawyers for the defense at the trial.
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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have the right to remain silent; any statement you do make may be
used as evidence against you; you have the right to the presence of an
attorney; if you cannot pay for an attorney, one will be appointed to
represent you. In establishing these "prophylactic standards" (as
they were later termed) for confession, the Court was attempting to
create, for itself and for the police stations of the nation, a set of
guidelines that would permit the judgment of whether a confession
had been given "voluntarily," or had been "compelled" or
"coerced." 5
"Voluntary" versus "compelled" had of course long been the
Court's major test of the admissibility of confessions at trial. But the
due process voluntariness test proved problematic in practice, and the
Court found itself presented with more and more petitions for review
of individual cases. 6 With Massiah v. United States7 and Escobedo
v. Illinois,8 the Court moved toward more specific rules-primarily
the right to counsel in pretrial questioning-to govern the situation in
which confessions could be said to be voluntary rather than coerced.
Miranda takes a leap forward in specifying those conditions without
which no confession will be admitted as voluntary. A cynical
interpretation of the Court's decision in Miranda would say that the
Court cut the Gordian knot of the problem of voluntariness by saying
to the police: If you follow these forms, we'll allow that the confes-
sion you obtained was voluntary. There is considerable post-Miranda
evidence indicating that the police quickly learned to play by the new
rules, and that they produced as many confessions as before. A more
generous interpretation would view the Court's decision as a well-
intentioned (if not entirely adequate) attempt to deal with a problem
as old as the history of criminal prosecution.9 What are the criteria
that allow us to know whether a confession has been voluntarily
5. On the "prophylactic standards," see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
6. In Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), Justice Frankfurter produced a sixty-
seven page "treatise" on the subject without reaching a resolution. Chief Justice Earl Warren,
concurring, points out that the opinion is going to offer little helpful guidance to police officers
(thus necessitating the Miranda decision). Id. at 636.
7. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
8. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9. The Court has of course retreated from some of the implications of Miranda in
subsequent cases, but the substance of Miranda remains in place. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
The most thoughtful discussion of the issues raised by Miranda that I have seen is Louis
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992). Seidman considers whether
Miranda should be deemed a "rejection of liberal individualism" or a "victory of liberal in-
dividualism," effectively bringing out the contradictions that inhabit the decision.
See also the penetrating comments of Robert Weisberg, in Criminal Law, Criminology, and
the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521 (1992).
For a wealth of additional detail about the Miranda case, see LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME,
LAW AND POLITICS (1983).
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made-and therefore that it may be accepted on its face as a reliable
confession of the truth? Behind this question may lie another one,
implicit rather than explicit in the Court's statements on confession:
What is it about confession that makes it such a difficult and slippery
notion? Why do we worry about confessions, and their truth value,
not only in the law, but also in literature and in daily life?
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, claims that the rules
and warnings established by Miranda "enable the defendant under
otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear. ' ' 1"
Opposed to this ideal of "storytelling without fear"-an unconstrained
context for confession-stands Justice White's comment, in his
dissenting opinion, that "it is by no means certain that the process of
confessing is injurious to the accused. To the contrary, it may provide
psychological relief and enhance the prospects for rehabilitation."11
I detect here two fundamentally opposed views of how confession
works, and how it is to be valued-as well as two incompatible views
of human nature and volition. White exaggerates only slightly when
he argues, "[tihe obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a
deep-seated distrust of all confessions,"12 which he finds in excess of
the Fifth Amendment injunction against compelling someone to bear
witness against himself. The issue joined here turns on the question
as to whether "storytelling," in the confessional mode, should and
even can take place "without fear."
Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, allows that the context of
custodial questioning never can be wholly without fear:
The atmosphere and questioning techniques, open and fair
though they be, can in themselves exert a tug on the suspect to
confess, and in this light "[tlo speak of any confessions of crime
made after arrest as being 'voluntary' or 'uncoerced' is somewhat
inaccurate, although traditional."... Until today, the role of the
Constitution has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to
assure spontaneous confessions.13
Justice Jackson's view, as quoted in Harlan's opinion, of the "in-
accurate but traditional" view of confession as voluntary or uncoerced
will need further meditation. To stay with Harlan's opinion, that
"tug" on the suspect to confess needs juxtaposition to one of the most
effective moments of Warren's opinion: the moment when he invents
what one might call the "story of the closed room."
10. 384 U.S. at 466.
11. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 537.
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Warren begins by founding this story on its inherent resistance to
telling. It is essential, he says, to understand what has gone on when
the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or
prosecuting attorneys "in a room in which he was cut off from the
outside world., 1 4 But "[t]he difficulty in depicting what transpires
at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they
have largely taken place incommunicado."' 5 After reviewing earlier
examples of police use of "third degree" tactics to extort confes-
sions-including beating, hanging, whipping, and prolonged incom-
municado interrogation-Warren allows that in modern interrogation,
physical brutality largely has given way to psychological coercion,
citing Blackburn v. Alabama16 to the effect that "the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
He continues, "Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as
to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms."17  Privacy
produces secrecy which produces a gap in our knowledge. As literary
scholars know, especially from the work of Wolfgang Iser, a "gap"
(Leerstelle) demands to be filled, activating the interpreter's in-
genuity.1"
To fill in the gaps, Warren, as ingenious interpreter, turns to police
interrogation manuals. 9 The tactics preached by these manuals are
as chilling as one might imagine. They recommend that interrogation
take place in private, so that the suspect, isolated from all familiar
surroundings, will "be deprived of every psychological advantage";'
that the interrogators assume from the outset that the suspect's guilt
is a fact, and that all they are after is an elaboration of a story the
police already know; that interrogation create "an oppressive
atmosphere of dogged persistence," with "no respite from the
atmosphere of domination"; that interrogators use the "Mutt and
Jeff," good-cop, bad-cop routine to scare the suspect and suggest
14. Id. at 445.
15. Id.
16. Id., 384 U.S. at 448 (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
17. Id.
18. See WOLFGANG ISER, THE IMPLIED READER [DER IMPLIZITE LESER] (Johns Hopkins
University Press 1984).
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 n.9 (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962), and CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION (1956), works which (in various editions) have had a circulation of over 44,000
copies).
Note that Justice Harlan, in his dissent, objects to Warren's extrapolation of the story of the
closed room from police interrogation manuals, which he characterizes as "merely writings in
this field by professors and some police officers." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 (citing O'HARA, supra note 19, at 99).
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possible leniency if he cooperates; that they establish a context of
dependency, so that the suspect feels he must throw himself on their
mercy; that tricks be used, such as fake line-ups with the accused
identified by fictitious witnesses.21 The idea, says Warren, is to get
the suspect to confirm "the preconceived story the police seek to have
him describe."22 At this point, one must ask of the confession made:
Whose story is it? If confession is in theory the most intimate and
personal of statements by a subject, how can this story be supplied by
his listener?' As Warren concludes, the "interrogation environment
is created for no other purpose than to subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner."24 From here, he argues the "intimate connec-
tion" between custodial interrogation and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 5
I have sketched only in brief outline how Warren uses the secrecy
of interrogation to create a dramatic story of the closed room, and the
dramas of humiliation, deception, and coercion played out behind the
locked door, convincing us that compulsion is "inherent" in custodial
interrogation.26  He has effectively responded to Frankfurter's
resigned complaint, in Culombe v. Connecticut, that "what actually
happens to [suspects] behind the closed door is difficult if not
impossible to ascertain."27  The closed room-in American police
stations, it is nicely labelled "the interview room"-may remind us of
the sealed Paris apartment of Edgar Allan Poe's The Murders in the
Rue Morgue, the first detective story and the model for the genre,
where this very closure activates the detective Dupin's interpretive
method.28 The enclosed, self-contained space, from the English
country house to the California villa, becomes a topos in detective
fiction precisely because, like that alc6ve where the young Sigmund
Freud was instructed by his mentor to seek the secrets of hysteria, it
appears to offer the inner sanctum of a hidden truth.29
21. Id. at 450-52 (citing INBAU & REID, supra note 19, and O'HARA, supra note 19).
22. Id. at 455.
23. In Escobedo v. Illinois, we learn that the police summon "an experienced lawyer who
was assigned to the Homicide Division to take statements from some defendants and some
prisoners that they had in custody, [who] 'took' petitioner's statement by asking carefully framed
questions apparently designed to assure the admissibility into evidence of the resulting answers."
378 U.S. 478, 483 (1904). In fact, most confessions by criminal suspects traditionally took the
form of a statement written by the interrogators, and signed by the suspect.
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
25. Id. at 458.
26. Id.
27. 367 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1961).
28. See EDGAR ALLAN POE, The Murders in the Rue Morgue in THE COMPLETE TALES AND
POEMS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE 141 (Vintage 1975).
29. See SIGMUND FREUD, On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, in 14 STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WRITINGS 13 (1974).
[Vol. 8:1
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Custodial police interrogation as we know it and as Miranda
attempts to deal with it, historically is consubstantial with the rise of
the detective story. There could be no cop stories before the
nineteenth century because there were no police forces in the modern
sense. Police interrogation at the station house did not take place
much before the end of the nineteenth century. Earlier, questioning
in other venues-such as the suspect's home, or before a
magistrate-was common, and the extension of the right against self-
incrimination to the station house simply unnecessary (a historical
evolution that the dissents in Miranda ignore). The story of the
closed room of course has its historical precedents, especially in
inquisitorial proceedings. So far as custodial interrogation by the
police is concerned, however, it is very much a product of modern,
urban crime and the social response to it. It is as if the pathological,
closed, and isolated space of the interrogation room had been created
to match the closed and isolated pathological space of the crime
scene. Warren's creation of the story of the closed room, his opening
up to light of its isolation and privacy and secrecy, his filling in of the
gaps in our knowledge, stands as an exemplary narrative. Where is
voluntariness in such a story? What confession can be trusted?
Yet, since the purpose of police work is to convict suspects and thus
protect society, one may feel some surprise, as well as admiration, for
the counter-conviction implied in Warren's opinion, that suspects
should be freed of the obligation to confess. That there is a right not
to confess does not seem self-evident. It runs counter to conventional
morality, which censures concealment and values the confession of
wrong-doing." In many a routine case, confession 'is necessary to
breach concealment and uncover the true story. Commonsensically,
we might assume that the evidence against the accused produced from
his own mouth is always the most reliable evidence we can have.
When someone confesses, his judges may proceed to condemn him
with a good conscience.
30. As Judge Friendly argued:
[W]hile the other privileges [for example, husband-wife, attorney-client, doctor-patient, and
priest-penitent] accord with notions of decent conduct generally accepted in life outside the
court room, the privilege against self-incrimination defies them. No parent would teach
such a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents preach is that while a misdeed, even a
serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clean breast of it will not be.
Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents,
employers, and teachers. Those who are questioned consider themselves to be morally
bound to respond, and the questioners believe it proper to take action if they do not.
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U.
CIN. L. REV. 671, 680 (1968). Friendly's comment elides the difference between confessing to
benevolent authorities and confession to the police, who are not about to forgive a misdeed-as
he partially acknowledges in a footnote. Id. at 680 n.48. He makes the important point, though,
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is counterintuitive to everyday morality.
1996]
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The Court's anxiety, of course, has a history-one that is intricated
with religious practices of confession and with the ecclesiastical courts,
reaching back at least to the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which
defined the Christian faith, enjoined once-a-year confession on the
faithful, and instituted a vast inquiry into heresy, including use of the
oath of de veritate dicenda, requiring those under suspicion to answer
truthfully, under oath, any question that might be posed.3 As the
Holy Office gained power in the fight against heretics, it developed
the doctrine that confession to heresy was necessary to save the
heretic's soul and preserve the purity of the Church: One had to stand
condemned by one's own word-even if that word had to be extracted
by the rack and pinion, and other ghastly techniques of torture.
Confession and inquisition in fact have close historical links. When
the Fourth Lateran Council gave up "ordeals," divine proofs of guilt
or innocence such as putting one's hand into fire, continental Europe
generally adopted rules of evidence, derived from Roman-canon law,
which said that in a capital case, only the testimony of two eyewitnes-
ses or the defendant's confession constituted full proof sufficient to
condemn. Circumstantial evidence was only partial proof. If partial
proofs-indicia-were abundant enough, torture was justified to seek
full proof by way of confession. A confession made under torture was
supposed to be fully repeated a day later without torture in order to
be valid (but if not so repeated, the suspect could be tortured again,
until he agreed to make the "voluntary" confession).32
In ordinary capital cases, the facts derived from confessions made
under torture were also supposed to be verified by independent
means, where possible.33  In cases of religious inquisition-the
inquiry into heretical beliefs-this was of course impossible, since the
matter being confessed to was entirely internal. Hence the special
problem of inquisitorial requirements of confession in cases of
religious belief and deeply-held personal conviction: There could be
no other source of convicting evidence than that produced by a
defendant's own lips-however extracted from those lips.
In England, the High Commission, the ecclesiastical equivalent of
the Star Chamber, imposed what was known as the oath ex officio,
which, like the oath of the Inquisition, required that one give a full
accounting for one's beliefs even in the absence of any specific charge.
31. See EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION 50 (1988).
32. Id. at 65; see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF (1977). See also
NIcoLAU EYMERICH & FRANCISCO PERqA, LE MANUEL DES INQUISITEURS (Louis Sala-Molins
trans. & ed., 1973). Eymerich, a Dominican from Catalonia, composed the Directorium
Inquistorium in Avignon in 1376; it was printed in 1503. Pefla's recompilation and updating of
the Directorium was published in Rome in 1585.
33. See LANGBEIN, supra note 32, at 9.
[Vol. 8:1
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Taking the oath put the religious non-conformist-who, in
Elizabethan England, could be either a Catholic or a Puritan-in a
double bind. If one confessed to the charge of heretical belief, one
was condemned. If one refused to confess, one was also condemned,
because in violation of the oath. In this context of inquisitorial
proceedings concerning matters of deeply-held religious beliefs and
personal conscience, the accused, with increasing frequency under
Elizabeth and the Stuarts, began to offer the defense summed up in
the Latin phrase nemo tenetur seipsum prodere: "no one is required
to bear witness against himself," which eventually became part of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.34 It was originally a claim
that there was a reserved domain, concerning matters of personal
conscience and belief, on which persons could not be required to
speak in proceedings potentially leading to their condemnation for the
belief. Gradually, this right was established in English law, in part
thanks to the effort of lawyers associated with the Puritan cause to
ground the right in the Magna Carta; that is, to see it as entailed by
the basic rights of free subjects, in a government where even monarch
and church are constrained by the law. By 1609, Lord High Justice
Sir Edward Coke could write:
[T]he Ecclesiastical Judge cannot examine any man upon his
oath, upon the intention and thought of his heart, for cogitationis
poenam nemo emeret [no man may be punished for his thought].
And in cases where a man is to be examined upon his oath, he
ought to be examined upon acts and words, and not of the
intention or thought of his heart; and if any man should be
examined upon any point of religion, he is not bound to answer
the same; for in time of danger, quis modus tutus erit [how will
he be safe] if everyone should be examined of his thoughts...
for it hath been said in the proverb, thought is free.35
This privilege, originally relating to ecclesiastical courts and to
questions of religious belief, came to be recognized as a fundamental
right of the accused in any criminal proceeding.
Both Justice Harlan and Justice White argue in their dissents in
Miranda that the privilege against self-incrimination and the rule
against coerced confessions have separate origins and separate
histories. Coerced confessions were originally barred because they
were perceived to be unfairly obtained, and thus unreliable. The
34. The most useful study of the history of the right against self-incrimination is the
magisterial book by LEVY, supra note 1. Some of Levy's historical arguments have been
challenged. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of
the European lus Commune, N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 962-90 (1990).
35. [Thomas] Edwards's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1421, 1422 (1609), Coke's Rep. 9, 10, cited in
LEVY, supra note 1, at 246.
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privilege against self-incrimination arose essentially to protect beliefs
and matters of conscience. Yet, since the compulsion to self-
incrimination could also produce confessions that were untrustworthy,
and coerced confessions violated a suspect's right to refuse to answer
under interrogation, an indissoluble connection has developed
between the exclusion of coerced confession and the privilege against
self-incrimination.36 If the "trustworthiness" of a confession seems
the more pragmatic, and perhaps useful, test, "voluntariness" may be
the more probative one. The "voluntariness" test relates not only to
the "content" of the confession (which in some cases can be verified
from other sources) but also to how it was produced, its context. This
test insists that the involuntary can never be accepted as trustworthy:
To coerce a mental state or psychological disposition-the choice to
confess-is somehow paradoxical.37 Above all, to compel confession
may be an ethical violation, somehow an invasion of human dignity.
The proposed procedural safeguards of Miranda touch on the relation
of individual rights to the state's power.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren briefly evokes the history of the
Fifth Amendment privilege as part of the search for "the proper scope
of governmental power over the citizen," and concludes that "our
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by
its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient
of compelling it from his own mouth."38 Compulsion, inquisition,
and torture lie in the background of the Court's suspicion of
confession. As Abe Fortas, soon to be a justice of the Supreme
Court, eloquently summed it up: "Mea culpa belongs to a man and
36. See LEVY, supra note 1, at 328.
37. For a probing analysis of this issue, see Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov's Question:
Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149 (1990).
Seidman argues (partially in reference to the permissible compulsion of United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605 (1984), in which the defendent was forced to sign a "consent decree"): "The point
is not that the government ought not to coerce such statements [regarding internal mental
states]. Rather, the government cannot coerce such statements because the application of
coercive pressure makes them something other than statements regarding internal mental
states." Seidman, supra, at 158. I will argue later that this may be correct, but the statements
may in that case hold another kind of confessional truth. I am not convinced that a "preference
coercion theory of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege," id. at 159, can wholly respond to the root
objections to compelled confessions, which seem to me to be ethical. In this context, see the
appropriately skeptical remarks of Robert Weisberg:
The jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment directly raises the question raised indirectly by
searches and seizures: What image of the autonomous human being do we believe in? We
have no coherent analysis of what it means to be autonomous in the face of the law, and
we are left instead with shallow rationalizations about the psychology of volition, abetted
in the Sixth Amendment area by hilarious rationalizations about the effects of the invisible
formalities of state prosecution on the volition of a poor wretch of a subject.
Weisberg, supra note 9, at 538-39.
38. 384 U.S. at 460.
[Vol. 8:1
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his God. It is a plea that cannot be exacted from free men by human
authority. To require it is to insist that the state is the superior of the
individuals who compose it, instead of their instrument. 3 9 The
Miranda warnings, then, set the conditions in which the voluntary
confessional narrative can unfold-or fail to unfold. The point, as
Warren puts it, is that "a knowing and intelligent waiver of these
rights [cannot] be assumed on a silent record."'  A "silent record"
is another "gap" attributable to the "closed room." Henceforth, the
record must speak, precisely of the accused's knowledge of the right
not to say anything that might be self-incriminating.
The Court's debates about the contexts in which confession is
allowable, in Miranda and other cases-and the continuing debate in
legal scholarship about the scope and even the raison d'etre of the
privilege against self-incrimination-may point, beyond issues of
specific legal doctrine, to a more general problem in our thinking
about confession. Consider that the law as we know it has elaborated
as a most basic right of the accused the protection against involuntary
confession, while Western literature, from early in the Romantic era
onward, has made the confessional mode a crucial kind of self-
expression, one that is supposed to bear a special stamp of sincerity
and authenticity, and to bear special witness to the truth of the
individual personality. From Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Michel Leiris,
from William Wordsworth to Philip Roth, the baring of one's
innermost thoughts and desires has been held to be a business as
necessary as it is risky. If psychoanalysis is perhaps the most
characteristic development of modern thought in the "human
sciences," it, too, appears to be predicated on the confessional act, in
a secular reinterpretation of auricular confession. Since the Council
of Trent (held in 1551), the Catholic Church has taught that confes-
sion, exomologesis, is of divine origin and necessary for one's spiritual
salvation. Modern cultures have, in their literature and their
therapies, adopted some version of this view. In a secularized world,
the insistence has come to be placed on truth to oneself. Attaining
this truth almost necessarily involves a confessional gesture, a claim
to lay bare that which is most intimate in order to know oneself, or
to make oneself known.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the symbolic fountainhead here. The
opening page of his Confessions, where he announces that he will
present himself before his creator on the Judgment Day with this
book in his hand, captures the transition between religious confession
39. Fortas, supra note 1.
40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498-99.
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and the secular writing of one's intimate self into a book: "I have
unveiled my inner being as you have seen it yourself," he announces
to this "sovereign judge."'" But readers of Rousseau have long been
aware that the act of confession does not offer access to the inner
being so straightforward or unproblematic as one might assume. The
problem may not be one of error in any simple sense. The study of
any autobiographical and confessional text can usually detect some
errors of fact, but that does not necessarily invalidate the confession
of the "inner being," which has no referential verifiability other than
the speech act that makes it known to us. But if that is the case, then
what is it that is being confessed to? In what sense is the confession
true, if its apparent referent is false? What other kind of truth, what
other place of truth, is involved? Herein lies the problem: What is
the relation of the act of confessing to the reliability of what is
confessed? If Rousseau, and other writers in the modern confessional
tradition, are clearly making "voluntary" confessions-in that no other
person is coercing them to confess-can we therefore trust the fruits
of confession? Indeed, what must we conclude about the very notion
of "voluntariness" in confession when we look at the circumstances of
the confessional speech act?
One may approach these questions through the famous episode of
the "stolen ribbon" that closes Book Two of the Confessions.
Following the death of Madame de Vercellis, in whose household the
young Rousseau has been a servant, a ribbon is found to be missing.
It is discovered among Rousseau's things. Summoned publicly by the
Comte de la Roque (acting as executor), Rousseau is asked where he
got the ribbon. He accuses the young kitchen maid Marion of having
given it to him. When she denies this calumny, Rousseau persists in
his accusation, and the Comte de la Roque, uncertain as to where the
truth lies, dismisses them both, with the comment that the conscience
of the guilty one will avenge the innocent. This, says Rousseau, has
happened every day since the incident. He goes on to imagine the
future fate of Marion, dismissed under suspicion of theft, no doubt
unable to find another place, condemned to a probable future of
prostitution. Rousseau, on the other hand, has continued to suffer
nighttime hallucinations in which he stands accused of the crime as if
it happened only yesterday. He has never been able to confess the
crime, even to his most intimate friends. The weight of the crime on
his conscience has been a key motive in his decision to write his
confessions.
41. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 5.
[Vol. 8:1
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Thus far, we seem to be close to Justice White's view that confes-
sion is good for one, that "it may provide psychological relief and
enhance the prospects for rehabilitation."" We may, however, have
some doubts about this result as we read on, for now Rousseau moves
from the narrative of what happened to the story of what he calls his
"dispositions intgrieures," his inner feelings. Here he tells an entirely
different story, one that stands in total contradiction to the external
events. He tells us that in fact malice was never farther from his
thoughts than in this "cruel moment." When he accused Marion, it
is bizarre but true that his "friendship" for her was the cause. "She
was present in my thoughts, I excused myself on the first object that
came to hand." 3 This seemingly random accusation is then further
specified: "I accused her of having done what I wanted to do and of
having given me the ribbon since my intention was to give it to
her."" Thus we have a problem in desire which, thwarted in its
intent, gives way to its apparent opposite, the wish to punish. If only
his accusers had given him time to repent, and the opportunity to
confess privately, he would have told the truth. But public exposure,
the risk of being publicly declared a thief and liar, is too strong for
him to perform on the spot the confession he wants to make-and
now makes so many years later. Over those years, Rousseau says, he
has been so persecuted that Marion has been well revenged. He
concludes with the request that he be allowed never to speak of this
incident again-a conclusion violated when he returns to the stolen
ribbon in the fourth of his Reveries du promeneur solitaire.
Rousseau's telling of the story of the stolen ribbon is a stunning and
troubling performance. Not only does it represent the emblematic
confession, where the failure to confess on the spot becomes the
motive for the very act of confessing as an accounting for one's life,
it also suggests that confession as a speech act accomplishes something
other than the simple revelation of a truth. Confession here permits
the staging of a scene of exposure, guilt, and retribution, which is the
very motive of confession. Paul de Man, in a classic essay on this
episode, effectively underlines the issue:
What Rousseau really wanted is neither the ribbon nor Marion,
but the public scene of exposure which he actually gets.... The
more there is to expose, the more there is to be ashamed of; the
more resistance to exposure, the more satisfying the scene, and
42. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
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especially, the more satisfying and eloquent the belated
revelation, in the later narrative, of the inability to reveal.45
In other words, this primal scene of exposure, shame, and guilt is
absolutely necessary to the project of making a confession, and if the
scene never occurred, one would have to invent something like it in
order to motivate and perform the writing of the Confessions. Qui
s'accuse s'excuse, says the French proverb: Self-accusation is a form
of self-excuse. As de Man suggests, the speech act of confession is
double. In the terms of J. L. Austin's famous distinction, there is a
constative aspect, the fault to which one confesses, and a performative
aspect, precisely the elusive and troubling action of the statement: "I
confess."" When one says, "Bless me Father, for I have sinned," the
constative meaning is: I have sinned, while the performative meaning
is: Absolve me of my sin. The confessional performance of guilt
always has this double aspect. Since it does, it opens the possibility
that the performative aspect will produce the constative, as the sin
needed in order to permit the act of confession. The law is not
without examples of signed confessions that have later been
repudiated and sometimes discovered to have been false-as in
Manchester, Vermont, in 1819-and there are no doubt other
examples where the truth never came to light.
How can someone make a false confession? Precisely because the
false referentiality of confession may be secondary to the need to
confess, a need produced by the coercion of interrogation or the
subtler coercion of the need to stage a scene of exposure as the only
propitiation of accusation, including self-accusation for being in a
scene of exposure.47 Or, as Talmudic law has recognized for
millennia, confession may be the product of the death-drive, the
production of incriminating acts to assure punishment or even self-
annihilation, and hence inherently suspect because it is in contradic-
45. PAUL DE MAN, Excuses (Confessions) [chapter 12], in ALLEGORIES OF READING 285
(1979).
46. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
47. This is consonant with the psychoanalytic model of confession developed in THEODOR
REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS 208 (1959). For Reik, confession expresses a desire for
punishment, and to the extent that it is made to a father-figure-representative of the
superego-it is perfectly consonant with the dependency model of police interrogation. Reik
says of the confession that takes the form of "acting out" in psychoanalysis:
This confession is often not an end in itself. It has the meaning of an appeal to the parents
or their substitutes, which is what makes necessary the addition of a concluding sentence:
"Please consider those weaknesses! Just because this is how I am, you must forgive me!
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tion to the basic human instinct of self-preservation.4" Or, as Freud
would have it, unconscious guilt may produce crime in order to assure
punishment as the only satisfaction of the guilt.49 Guilt can in any
event always be produced to meet the demand for confession, since
there is always more than enough guilt to go around, and its
concealment can itself be a powerful motive for confession. One
might want to say that confession, even if compelled, is always in
some sense "true" as a performative, indeed as a performance, but
this does not guarantee that it is not false as a constative, as a
relevant "fact."
Furthermore, the French proverb I cited can also be turned around:
Qui s'excuse s'accuse, or self-excuse serves to incriminate one.
"Excuses generate the very guilt they exonerate," writes de Man, and
"there can never be enough guilt around to match the text-machine's
infinite power to excuse."5°  De Man concludes (using the term
"cognitive" where I would use Austin's "constative"):
Since guilt, in this description, is a cognitive and excuses a perfor-
mative function of language, we are restating the disjunction of
the performative from the cognitive: any speech act produces an
excess of cognition, but it can never hope to know the process of
its own production (the only thing worth knowing). 1
That is, the performative aspect of the speech act is not itself the
object of cognition.
To restate this in simpler terms: The confessional rehearsal or
repetition of guilt is its own kind of performance, producing at the
same time the excuse of guilt (by the fact of confessing it) and the
accumulation of more guilt (by the act of confessing it), in a dynamic
that is potentially infinite. The more you confess, the more guilt is
produced. The more the guilt produced, the more the confessional
48. Consider the Talmudic rule that in a criminal case, a person can be condemned only on
the testimony of two witnesses, and that his or her own confession, even if voluntarily given,
cannot be admitted as evidence. In the commentary by Maimonides:
It is a scriptural decree that the court shall not put a man to death or flog him on his own
admission [of guilt].... For it is possible that he was confused in mind when he made the
confession. Perhaps he was one of those who are in misery, bitter in soul, who long for
death, [who] thrust the sword into their bellies or cast themselves down from the roofs.
Perhaps this was the reason that prompted him to confess to a crime he had not
committed, in order that he be put to death. To sum up the matter, the principle that no
man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.
MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: BOOK FOURTEEN, THE BOOK OF JUDGES 52-53
(Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1949), cited in LEVY, supra note 1, at 438. As Levy pertinently
comments, in this view "confession was a form of suicide, which was sinful and violative of the
instinct of self-preservation." LEVY, supra note 1, at 438.
49. SIGMUND FREUD, Criminals from a Sense of Guilt [chapter 3], in 14 STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS 332-33 (1916).
50. DE MAN, supra note 45, at 299.
51. Id. at 299-300.
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machine functions. The very act of confessing necessarily produces
guilt in order to be functional. As a speech act, "I confess" implies
and necessitates guilt, and if the guilt is not there in the referent, as
an object of cognition, it is in the speech act itself, which simulta-
neously exonerates and inculpates. One typical way in which this
doubleness of confession operates in criminal law is recorded in the
predecessor to Miranda, Escobedo v. Illinois.52 In Escobedo, suspect
Danny Escobedo is told that his associate Benedict DiGerlando has
pinned the shooting on him, then he is taken to the room where
DiGerlando is undergoing interrogation; there he accuses DiGerlando
of lying, exclaiming: "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it."53 Here
Escobedo's attempt to exculpate himself involves an admission of
direct knowledge of the shooting that inculpates him as at least an
accomplice to the crime. David Simon's detailed account of police
interrogations in Baltimore indicates that such self-incrimination
through attempted self-exculpation is very common." Rousseau's
confession of the stolen ribbon is of course more complex, and more
akin to the sins of conscience aimed at by inquisitorial proceedings;
yet he, too, may inculpate himself while ostensibly seeking excul-
pation.
Rousseau's example is different also, it may be claimed, since he
wants to confess. Yet his voluntary confession comes under the
compulsion of writing his Confessions, in a generic constraint to reveal
all his guilty secrets; indeed, he could not confess without guilty
secrets, which the act of confession would have to invent (and may in
fact invent) if they did not already exist. Conversely, can we be sure
that suspects in criminal cases themselves don't want to confess,
especially when they have been told, over hours, days, and nights of
intensive interrogation that it is only by confessing that they can be
released from the obligation to confess-that their guilt is certain and
its corroboration alone will release them from the extreme duress in
which they find themselves? And that the refusal to confess is itself
an admission of guilt?55
52. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
53. Id. at 483.
54. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 200 (1991). See also
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE LAW
SCHOOL, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 23 (1987) (declaring that Miranda warnings have not
significantly reduced number of confessions because "suspects agree to talk without the need
for pressure or deception (often because they think they can talk their way out of trouble)").
The attempt to "talk their way out of trouble" often involves unwitting confessions to
incriminating knowledge.
55. Schulhofer quotes the pre-Miranda edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confession,
in which the interrogator is instructed to say to the suspect: "Joe, you have the right to remain
silent. That's your privilege.... But let me ask you this. Suppose you were in my shoes and
I were in yours... and I told you, 'I don't want to answer any of your questions.' You'd think
[Vol. 8:1
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Confession alone will bring release from the situation of accusation
and allow reintegration with normal social existence and community.
We return to some of the deep-seated suspicions of confession that
Justice White detected, I think correctly, in the majority opinion in
Miranda. There is something inherently unstable and unreliable
about the speech act of confession, about its meaning and its motives.
You may, as in Rousseau's case, be confessing simultaneously to avoid
punishment (to obtain absolution) and to assure punishment (to
produce the scene of shame and guilt). Even without the oath de
veritate dicenda, you may be in a situation of damning yourself if you
do confess or if you don't confess. Or you may be confessing to the
wrong crime, that is, producing what you think your interrogators
want in order to avoid confessing to something for which you feel
more guilty. Or, more generally, you may be confessing to something
else, something other than what you think is the referent of your
confession.
This brings us back to the question of "voluntariness." In what
sense can we say that a confession is voluntary? In the case of
Brewer v. Williams, Justice White, dissenting, writes: "Men usually
intend to do what they do, and there is nothing in the record to
support the proposition that respondent's decision to talk was
anything but an exercise of his own free will."56 In another dissent
in the same case, Chief Justice Burger states: "The human urge to
confess wrongdoing is, of course, normal in all save hardened
criminals, as psychiatrists and analysts have demonstrated."57 While
both White and Burger disagree with the Court's conclusion that
suspect Williams confessed involuntarily, they offer somewhat
different views of confession. For White, statements are utterances
I had something to hide." Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 14 n.14 (citing INBAU & REID, supra
note 19, at 111).
56. 430 U.S. 387, 434 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 421 (Burger, J., dissenting). Burger refers his reader here to Reik, without
understanding the full implications of Reik's argument, which suggests that the need to confess
may have little to do with the crime committed. Indeed, Reik argues that crime may be the
result of guilt, rather than vice versa:
Freud has shown that, in the criminals at whom criminal legislation is really directed, a
powerful unconscious feeling of guilt exists even before the deed .... It is hence not the
consequence of the deed, but its motive.... As a result, punishment, according to accepted
views, the most effective deterrent against crime, becomes, under certain psychological
extremely common conditions in our culture, the most dangerous unconscious stimulus for
crime because it serves the gratification of the unconscious feeling of guilt, which presses
toward a forbidden act.
THEODOR REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS 473-74 (1959). This understanding of the
relation of guilt, crime, and punishment is fully consonant with what we have seen in Rousseau.
Technically, Brewer is not a "voluntariness" case since it was decided on Sixth Amendment,
not Fifth Amendment, doctrine, but it does turn on whether Williams voluntarily waived his
right to counsel (for which there are a special set of rules).
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from which one can generally infer the intention to make them.
Intention and utterance line up in an unambiguous manner. For
Burger, the intention of the confessional statement is slightly
displaced; it lies elsewhere, in the urge to confess. This urge may, as
Rousseau's case so well demonstrates, be aberrant, the product of a
need for exposure and punishment, and thus may not fully coincide
with White's kind of intentionality, a point which the two Justices do
not confront.
Let me try to press harder on this question of the kind of volun-
tariness at issue in confession. First, a quotation from Dean Wigmore
concerning the decision whether or not to confess:
The situation is always one of choice between two alternatives-
either one disagreeable, to be sure, but still subject to a choice.
... All conscious verbal utterances are and must be voluntary;
and that which may impel us to distrust one is not the cir-
cumstance that it is involuntary, but the circumstance that the
choice of false confession is a natural one under the con-
ditions.5 8
Wigmore appears to confirm White's hard-headed doctrine that
everything one says-if conscious, not under the influence of drugs,
or whatever-is necessarily voluntary, though it does leave open the
important and troubling escape-hatch that circumstances may make
the confessional utterance false rather than true.
Now, here is a quotation from Justice Jackson's dissent in Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, already mentioned in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Miranda:
It probably is the normal instinct to deny and conceal any
shameful or guilty act. Even a "voluntary confession" is not
likely to be the product of the same motives with which one may
volunteer information that does not incriminate or concern him.
The term "voluntary" confession does not mean voluntary in the
sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one's soul of a
sense of guilt. "Voluntary confessions" in criminal law are the
product of calculations of a different order, and usually proceed
from a belief that further denial is useless and perhaps
prejudicial. To speak of any confessions of crime made after
arrest as being "voluntary" or "uncoerced" is somewhat inac-
curate, although traditional.
A confession is wholly and uncontestably voluntary only if a
guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own
accuser. The Court bases its decision on the premise that
custody and examination of a prisoner for thirty-six hours is
58. 3 JoHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 824 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 8:1
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"inherently coercive." Of course it is. And so is custody and
detention for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and
so is detention.59
Jackson's dissent from the finding that Ashcraft's confession was
coerced unfolds as a narrative of how Ashcraft dug a hole for himself
during his interrogation, attempting to implicate an accomplice in a
way that eventually pointed to his own guilt, and obliged him to
confess: again, inculpation by way of attempted exculpation.
Jackson's seems to me one of the most honest and accurate
statements on confession from the Supreme Court, even though he
uses it, in my view, to support the wrong conclusions. He effectively
evacuates the issue of "voluntariness" in our usual understanding of
the term. He makes us understand that if we can say, with Wigmore
and White, that all confessional statements are somehow intentional,
in another sense they are all unintentional-or rather, correspond to
some intention other than that which we usually associate with
intentional statements. To be put in a situation where one is made
dependent on one's interrogators and asked to confess-pressured to
confess-would always seem to create the possibility that the motive
of the confessional statement will be different from that of normal
intentional statements. Its intentions will be aberrant, which, at worst,
may make it a false confession, or, at least, a confession whose truth
is not in its referent, a confession that is not constative but perfor-
mative.
In Brewer, 60 the suspect's confession and what produces it are
particularly interesting. The suspect, Robert Williams, a recent
escapee from a mental hospital, has surrendered to the police in
Davenport, Iowa, on the advice of the Des Moines lawyer whom he
has telephoned, and has been charged with abducting a nine-year-old
girl in Des Moines. The Des Moines police set out to bring Williams
back to Des Moines, but not before agreeing with his Des Moines
lawyer, in an arrangement confirmed by a Davenport lawyer, that
Williams will not be interrogated during the ride in the police car (a
ride from which the Davenport lawyer is excluded). During the drive,
Detective Learning does refrain from an "interrogation" of Williams,
in the traditional sense. Instead, he makes what has come to be
known as the "Christian Burial Speech." Addressing Williams, whom
he knows to be a deeply religious person, as "Reverend," he proceeds
to discuss the weather conditions, the forecast of several inches of
snow, the likelihood that the young girl's body will be buried and un-
59. 322 U.S. 143, 160-61 (1944).
60. 430 U.S. at 392-93.
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locatable. Since Williams must know where the body is, he could take
the police officers to it-and then her parents could give her a decent
Christian burial. Leaming then says to Williams:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling
down the road .... They are predicting several inches of snow
for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that
knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only
been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself
may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past
the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop
and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be
entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched
away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered.... I do not
want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it any further.
Just think about it as we're riding down the road.6'
Williams eventually directs the police to a service station, where he
claims to have left the girl's shoes, then to a rest area where he claims
to have left a blanket in which the body was wrapped, and finally
leads them to the body itself.
No one sitting on this case doubts for a moment that Williams is
guilty of a horrible crime. His confession is certainly reliable,
validated by a corpse. The issue is whether that confession has been
obtained in violation of his rights. Warned of his right to remain
silent and of his right to counsel-and having additionally obtained a
promise from the police that he would not be interrogated in the
absence of counsel during the drive--does Williams' confession
indicate a knowing waiver of his rights, making his confession
voluntary, or an infringement of his rights, invalidating the confes-
sion? The Court, in another 5-4 split decision, concluded that
Williams' confession was invalid. It based that decision not on
Miranda, but on the earlier case, Massiah v. United States, 62 which
established that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment applied during pre-trial interrogation. The reliance on
Massiah rather than Miranda as precedent may represent a choice to
use the simplest applicable rule, and perhaps also to avoid the
controversies that continue to swirl around the Miranda decision.63
61. 430 U.S. at 392.
62. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
63. See YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1980) (arguing that
Brewer should have been decided under a Miranda doctrine, rather than Massiah doctrine).
The question of whether or not Williams voluntarily waived his right to counsel points to a
continuing difficulty in Miranda doctrine: How can we know if a waiver is voluntary? If counsel
is necessary to avoid unwitting self-incrimination, isn't counsel necessary knowingly to waive the
right to counsel? Note that the statement "I waive [my right to...]" is another performative.
[Vol. 8:1
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Deciding whether Williams' confession was illegally obtained during
interrogation in absence of counsel turns in part on whether the
"Christian Burial Speech" was interrogation. To Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting, the test of an interrogation seems to involve the common-
sensical idea that it is followed by a question mark. "I find it most
remarkable," he writes, "that a murder case should turn on judicial
interpretation that a statement becomes a question simply because it
is followed by an incriminating disclosure from the suspect. ' Does
a statement that elicits a response constitute a question? Burger
characterizes Detective Leaming's speech not as interrogation, but as
"statements" intended to prick the conscience of the accused.65 The
majority on the other hand claims that the Christian Burial Speech is
"tantamount to interrogation. " 66 "There can be no serious doubts,"
Justice Stewart writes for the Court, "that Detective Leaming
deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams
just as surely as-and perhaps more effectively than-if he had
formally interrogated him.
67
The "Christian Burial Speech" is in effect like the confession
statement prepared by police interrogators for the suspect to sign: his
confession written by another, to which, in this case, he responds, not
with a signature, but with the revelation of a dead body. Justice
Marshall, in his concurrence, characterizes Leaming's speech as a
"charade," quoting from Blackburn v. Alabama: "The detective
demonstrated once. again 'that the efficiency of the rack and the
thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by more
sophisticated modes of 'persuasion."'" For Marshall, there is torture
in the air, whereas for the dissenters, as Justice Blackmun puts it,
"persons in custody frequently volunteer statements in response to
stimuli other than interrogation.,
69
Blackmun's dissent contains a sentence that strikes one as slightly
curious in a Supreme Court opinion, and somehow characteristic of
this strange case. He writes: "I am not persuaded that Leaming's
observations and comments, made as the police car traversed the
snowy and slippery miles between Davenport and Des Moines that
winter afternoon, were an interrogation, direct or subtle, of Wil-
liams."7 The evocation of the police car negotiating the icy high-
way, with Leaming and Williams engaged in their weird and fateful
64. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 419-20.
65. Id. at 419.
66. Id. at 400.
67. Id. at 399.
68. Id. at 408 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
69. Id. at 439.
70. ld. at 1260.
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dialogue, seems almost to suggest a classic situation of storytelling on
a winter's afternoon.71 There is a kind of dreamy atmosphere to it,
as if we could never quite recapture the motives of telling and
listening, and the way that telling a story-as in the Christian Burial
Speech--can elicit the profoundest, and most incriminating, responses
from a listener. If Leaming's story is like Hamlet's "mousetrap," the
play-within-the-play-"the play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the
conscience of the king" 72 -who is to say whether such a play
(Marshall's "charade") is innocent or not, since it simply reveals a
pre-existing guilt? Indeed, it leads to a dead body. Yet, is "pricking
conscience" an innocent act? Or a violative one?
Brewer seems to me such an interesting and troubling case precisely
because the motive of the confessional act, in that closed police car
traversing the snowy and slippery miles, remains so obscure. Why
does Williams confess? Should we inquire so closely into the why?
In the absence of the rack and the thumbscrew, should we be
suspicious of the "charade," of the well-told story that pricks or traps
its listener into self-implication, into signing on to a confession
prepared by another? Isn't this what many good stories attempt to
do? Doesn't confessional literature, precisely of the type associated
with Rousseau, with Dostoevsky, with Gide, want to elicit a counter-
confession in which the reader admits to complicity?73 And yet, in
that case, whose story is it? Who is the author of the confession,
Leaming or Williams? Hasn't the person who should be the listener
to the story, Leaming, become its teller, and he who should be its
teller, Williams, its listener? And what authority does the story then
have? How can we authenticate a confession as "voluntary" when we
know so little about its motives and intentions? And how can the
law, which cannot remain within the ambiguities of literature, handle
such elusive kinds of speech?
The Court consistently has held that it finds no problem with
compelled evidence: A defendant may be compelled to surrender tax
documents and bank records, to produce a handwriting sample, even
to submit to a blood test.74 In the case of the compelled blood test,
71. See ITALIO CALVINO, IF ON A WINTER'S NIGHT A TRAVELLER [SE UNA NOTTE
D'INVERNO UN VIAGGIAORE] (William Weaver trans., 1981).
72. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, lines 604-05 (G. Blakemore Evans ed.,
Riverside ed., Houghton Mifflin 1974).
73. See in particular, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND (Richard Pevear
& Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Knopf 1993) (1864), and ANDRP GIDE, THE IMMORALIST (1902),
novels where a first-person confessional narrative makes the listener or reader uneasy through
complicity, and suggests that listener and reader needs to confess as well.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (tax records); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting samples). In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 666 (1984),
Justice O'Connor claims: "Only the introduction of a defendant's own testimony is proscribed
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Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, argues that the privilege
against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State
with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the
withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question did not
involve compulsion to these ends."75  In dissent, Justice Black
ripostes that the Court's finding that "compelling a person to give his
blood to help the State convict him is not equivalent to compelling
him to be a witness against himself strikes me as an extraordinary
feat. 7 6 While one may be sympathetic to this view, Justice Brennan
does touch on a central distinguishing feature of Fifth Amendment
history and jurisprudence. It is what a defendant may do with his
lips-what may issue from his mouth-that is considered worthy of
special protection. It is as if the Court implicitly understood-without
ever articulating it as such-that the problem of confession, its
voluntariness or its compulsion, is one that concerns a speech act.
What I detect, in cases such as Miranda and Brewer, and in the
long, complex history of the right against self-incrimination, is the
law's semi-conscious struggle to come to terms with the difficult,
layered notion of the speech act that follows from the statement: "I
confess." Chief Justice Warren displays a certain awareness of this
special aspect of confessions when, in Miranda, he notes of the
Court's newly-prescribed warnings: "A warning is a clear-cut fact."77
If a warning is a "fact," it is so in the mode of a speech act: "I warn
you that. . . "constitutes a performative, whatever the content of the
warning. It is as if this performative were striving to do justice to the
performative conditions of confession. Possibly some of the conten-
tiousness and uncertainty of the debate about the Fifth Amendment
protection could be illuminated, if not resolved, by fuller recognition
that confession involves a special, and especially complex, form of
speech act.
Speech acts, Austin tells us, can "misfire" if the "felicity conditions"
are not right. For instance, if you consent to marriage before a priest
who is really not a priest at all but your seducer's best friend in
priest's clothing (something played out in a number of Gothic novels),
your "I do" has no standing. Yale Kamisar produces a hypothetical
by the Fifth Amendment's mandate that no person 'shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.' That mandate does not protect an accused from being compelled to surrender
nontestimonial evidence against himself." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). I have benefitted here from reading Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MiCH. L. REV. 857 (1995).
75. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
76. Id. at 773.
77. 384 U.S. at 469.
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scenario for the law: The suspect asks for a priest, in order to make
confession, and is sent a police officer disguised as a priest. What
then is the status of his confession?7" The outrageous example is not
unrelated to Brewer, where Learning addresses Williams as
"Reverend," though there is no one present who merits that title.
What are the "felicity conditions" in which the voluntary confession
can be made, and recognized as voluntary? What are the contexts in
which Warren's "storytelling without fear" can go forward? Where
confession is concerned, do these questions even make sense, or is the
speech act so layered with contradictory intentions that one can never
use the term "voluntary" in confidence, and thus never be wholly sure
that confession and its intention match in any unambiguous way?
The Court has continued to assert that the acceptable confession
must be "the product of a free and rational will," as Justice O'Connor
states in Miller v. Fenton.7 9 Yet as Justice Frankfurter recognized in
Culombe v. Connecticut, "The notion of 'voluntariness' is itself
amphibian. It purports at once to describe an internal psychic state
and to characterize that state for legal purposes."8  Frankfurter's
opinion offers a cautionary tale about why a traditional philosophical
analysis of the problem of voluntariness, couched in terms of free will
and responsibility, can never really reach the situation of confession,
and why Miranda, in its turn, encounters difficulties, as Louis Michael
Seidman puts it, "by transforming an intractable metaphysical doctrine
into a bureaucratically administrable test."'" Rules governing the
conditions of confession may never be wholly adequate with respect
to the problem, since they address only the context, not the nature of
confession. Furthermore, they tend to create an infinite regression in
our thinking about the problem: What, for instance, will be our rules
for recognizing a "knowing waiver" of the right not to confess?
Robert Weisberg notes that in the wake of Miranda we still have
"no coherent analysis of what it means to be autonomous in the face
of the law, and we are left instead with shallow rationalizations about
the psychology of volition."82 We are essentially left with ideological
rationalizations for a situation in which Supreme Court debates and
the realities of the "interview room" have little in common. Citing
78. See KAMISAR, supra note 63, at 187. One finds versions of this hypothetical in cases
involving jailhouse informants.
79. 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985).
80. 367 U.S. 568, 605 (1961).
81. Seidman, supra note 9, at 719. Seidman also characterizes Frankfurter's opinion in
Culombe as a "disaster." For a critical examination of the philosophical analysis of the problem,
see Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859
(1979). Kamisar argues in Police Interrogation and Confessions that "trustworthiness" is a better
test than "voluntariness," though it, too, presents problems. KAMISAR, supra note 63.
82. Weisberg, supra note 9, at 538.
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David Simon's evidence from his experience in Baltimore that
Miranda warnings don't prevent suspects from talking, Weisberg
suggests that Miranda offers "a chance for some philosophical
excurses on why we have created this amazing ideological rational-
ization.""3 The sense of the individual, and of the individual's rights,
implicit in our Constitution generally assumes that the individual is
representative of an Enlightenment conception of Man: an essentially
rational choice-maker with a free will. In a post-Freudian, post-
Foucaultian age (to use a shorthand), we know this conception is
inadequate-the ego is no longer master in its house, the subject no
longer unitary-yet we don't know what to substitute for it. The
direction to be taken by those "philosophical excurses" is unclear. It
may, however, be fair to say that no philosophical excursus will ever
quite reach the problem of confession unless it engages the nature of
the confessional speech act.
As Abe Fortas seemed to suggest, in that eloquent line which
echoes Maimonides, confession may ultimately concern a truth of
angels, not of men. Or at least, a truth whose use in the human arena
is so fraught with complexities that it had better be set aside. A
certain strain in modern literature, descending in direct line from
Rousseau, has understood very well the disturbing power of the
confession, whether autobiographical or fictional. Think of the self-
abasing and self-aggrandizing confessional speeches of Dostoevsky's
Karamazov, or Raskolnikov, or his Underground Man; the original
instance of what Mikhail Bakhtin has called "the dialogic."84 These
monologues implicate the words and anticipated reactions of their
listeners, so that listener, or reader, cannot escape scot-free from
having listened to them. Think of a more recent instance, Albert
Camus' The Fall,85 in which the narrator tells his sordid tale to an
unidentified listener in an Amsterdam bar, precisely to transmit the
taint of guilt, an implication in a story in which none of us can fully
proclaim his or her innocence. Consider, finally, the complex version
of confession presented in Jorge Luis Borges' story, The Shape of the
Sword, where what appears to be the third-person narration of the
abject treachery of one Vincent Moon suddenly is revealed as the
83. Id. at 540.
84. I allude to various confessional speeches in FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS
KARAMAZOV (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., 1990) (1879-80) (speeches of old
Karamazov, Ivan, and Dimitri), and in FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT)
(Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Knopf 1972) (1866) (Raskolnikov's various
approaches to confession, and finally his full confession), and in DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 73.
These speeches are "dialogic" in that they are shaped by, and incorporate within themselves, the
anticipated reactions, replies, interrogations of others-whether these others are present or not.
See MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS (Carol Emerson trans., 1984).
85. ALBERT CAMUS, LA CHUTE [THE FALL] (1956).
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personal narrative of the speaker: "I am Vincent Moon," and he
concludes his narrative: "Now despise me." 6
Confession in this mode is serviceable less as a way to unburden
one's own conscience than to burden another's-in the manner of
Leaming's Christian Burial Speech. The question, in these instances,
is what you do with the confession that has been passed on to you.
What seems called for is a confession in return-which is what
Rousseau challenges his reader to on the first page of his Confessions.
This points toward a possible mass hysteria of confession-and the
experience is not unknown-in which the excess of confessional
discourse only makes it more difficult to pin down the motive and the
referent, the constative or cognitive element, of the aberrant speech
act (one could think in this context of some of the troubling cases of
mass child-abuse alleged, and rarely proved). Given the obscurity of
the motives of confession, it seems to be a mode of discourse capable
of producing both the deepest truth and the most damaging untruth.
Rousseau's desire to bare his soul entirely entails an ethics and an
aesthetics that he summarizes in his insistence that he is going to say
everything, "tout dire." "I have only one thing to fear in this
enterprise," writes Rousseau, "that isn't to say too much or to say
untruths; it's rather not to say everything, and to silence truths."
87
The enterprise of "saying everything" is not without its frightening
aspects. One has only to think of Rousseau's deviant disciple, the
Marquis de Sade, who pushes the tout dire to a kind of paroxysm,
cudgeling his imagination to produce every "crime of love" that he
can possibly invent, and describing it all in detail over hundreds of
pages. The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom,"s Sade's
archetypal work, becomes a kind of manic encyclopedia of perversity,
of the need to speak the unspeakable, to confess to everything that
society and repressed sexuality normally hold in check. What
transpires in Sade's closed rooms suggests that the unleashed
confessional urge proliferates guilt, and guilty pleasures, that society
prefers to censor.
We might think, finally, of the psychoanalytic model of confessional
discourse, since it is perhaps our most sophisticated contemporary
version of what it means to speak, against one's conscious intentions,
a truth whose value is estimated by its difficulty. The patient with the
psychoanalyst of course resembles a secularized version of the
86. Jorge Luis Borges, The Shape of the Sword, in LABYRINTHS 71 (D.A. Yerby trans.,
1954).
87. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 175.
88. MARQUIS DE SADE, ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY DAYS OF SODOM AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Austryn Wainhouse & Richard Seaver trans., Grove Press 1966).
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penitent with the priest. The crucial difference, however, is that the
patient does not know the "sin" to be "confessed," but only the
disorders, the stumbling-blocks, that have been produced by material
that has been repressed. The analyst, like the interrogator, must
attempt to uncover what the analyst knows that the patient knows,
but knows only unconsciously. In working toward the knowledge of
this blocked knowledge, the analyst-relying, like both priest and
interrogator, on a certain transferential bond with the patient-must
attempt to elicit a confessional mode of discourse. But it is a strange
one, since the patient's "confessions" of truth must always be
regarded with suspicion, as serving some other motive-guilt, revenge,
self-justification, self-abasement. The real truth of the psychoanalytic
situation is marked by resistances, by the patient's reluctance to
articulate it, to come face to face with it. Consequently, much of
analysis is directed to resistances, precisely to the non-confessional or
the anti-confessional, on the assumption that this is where the truth
is to be sought, the place that the unconscious has marked with its
power of censorship. Psychoanalysis in this manner recognizes that
the speech act of confession is a dubious guide to the truth, which
must rather be sought in the resistance to such speech, which itself
may simply fulfill other purposes, be the confession to a kind of
dependency on and propitiation of the analyst. The need to confess
speaks of guilt, certainly, but it does not speak the guilt itself, does
not locate that psychic configuration that needs discovery and healing.
It is not the "voluntary" confession that interests the psychoanalyst,
but the involuntary one, that which, we can almost say, is coerced
from the patient. For psychoanalysis, the claim of confession is neces-
sarily of limited value, not a sure guide to the truth, and the test of
voluntariness an utterly misleading criterion. The true confession may
lie most of all in the resistance to confession. Chief Justice Warren's
"storytelling without fear" appears as a utopian construct.
The psychoanalytic understanding of confession is consonant with
that enacted, rather than that proposed, by Rousseau, which is not
surprising when one considers how much Freud owes to Rousseau.8 9
That is, psychoanalysis displays an awareness of the doubleness of the
confessional act, the motivational discrepancy between the constative
and performative aspects of confession, a suspicion that the referential
matter of the confession-the sin or fault presented-is not neces-
sarily the meaning or the truth of the confession, that which is
intended by the speech act. In its understanding that speech, avowal,
89. Rousseau's discovery of the importance of childhood affect and infantile sexuality was
an inspiration to Freud, which he explicitly recognizes in 7 FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE
THEORY OF SEXUALIrrY 193 (1905).
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and, eventually, truth are transactional, transferential, and dialogic,
psychoanalysis warns us that the situations in which stories are told,
the relative positions and the affective relations of tellers and
listeners, can make all the difference.
I wonder, then, if the Supreme Court's difficulties in dealing with
the concept and the act of confession don't betray a semi-conscious
awareness of the problematic, double, perhaps even duplicitous nature
of confession as a speech act. It may be that the only true confessions
are involuntary, somehow coerced, if only by the fact that their truth
is not there where it appears to be. So it is that confession may be
inherently unreliable for purposes of the law, and for the policing of
society. The story of what goes on in that closed room, where
interrogations lead to confessions, always leaves us uneasy, like so
many modern narratives proffered by "unreliable narrators,"
narratives indeed that give us no basis for judging what "reliability"
might mean. In the case of confession, that unreliability can be
contagious, since it suggests that the more the guilt confessed, the
more the guilt there will be to confess, since the act of confession
produces further culpability.
As Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the confessional narrator of Camus'
The Fall, puts it: "In any case, we can't affirm the innocence of
anyone, while we can certainly affirm the guilt of everyone."9 For
Clamence, this generalization of guilt becomes an explicit invitation
to his listener to join in the confessional game:
The more I accuse myself the more I have the right to judge you.
Even better, I provoke you to judge yourself, which helps to
comfort me. 0 my friend, we are strange and miserable
creatures, and to the extent that we look back over our lives, we
don't lack for occasions to be astonished and scandalized by
ourselves. Try it. Be assured that I will listen to your own
confession with a strong sense of fraternity.9'
It is not certain that we want to join the game, that we want such a
reduplication of confession, that we know what to do with it. Justice
Harlan may unintentionally make the point when he says in Miranda,
"This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of
constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one
story too many is added."92 The pun on "stories" as architecture and
90. CAMUS, supra note 85, at 119. The translation is my own.
91. Id. at 152.
92. 384 U.S. at 526.
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as narrative is no doubt involuntary, but it suggests a perception of
the uncontrollable proliferation of narratives produced by confession.
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